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LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION IN
MISSOURI UNDER THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF 1875
(Continued from last issue)
Chapter V. A Study of the Cases Involving an Application
of the Constitutional Limitations.
It was indicated in the preceding chapter that a general
law relates to persons or things as a class; that this class is
determined by a "distinguishing peculiarity" which bears a
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the statute was
enacted; and that this class includes all things which may
come within it at any future time. It now remains to exam-
ine the cases in which this test has been applied.
In section fifty-three of article four of the constitution,
as has been noted before, there are thirty-three subdivisions.
Thirty-two of these subdivisions enumerate classes of sub-
jects concerning which no local or special law shall be pass-
ed. In the thirty-second subdivision is found the general
provision that "in all other cases where a general law can be
made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted."
The effect of the enumeration of classes of subjects is to pro-
hibit absolutely any local or special laws upon those matters.
The effect of the general provision is to prohibit local and
special laws in all cases where a general law, as determined in
the last instance by the courts, can be made applicable; and
to permit the enactment of local and special laws upon sub-
jects other than those set out in the thirty-two subdivisions
whenever a general law can not be made applicable, provided
the formalities of section fifty-four of article four are com-
plied with. The problem of classification, then, is the same
under the enumerated list of subjects as under the general
provision; and in the discussion of the cases arising under
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section fifty-three, no classification of the decisions will be
made. The enactment of local and special laws where a
general law cannot be made applicable is taken up in con-
nection with section fifty-four of article four of the constitu-
tion.
A. THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION.
The principle upon which a classification may be made
depends upon the nature of the persons or things upon which
the contemplated statute is intended to operate, and upon
the purpose or object of the proposed statute for which the
classification is made. The basis of classification may be
made upon differences in population, geographical location,'
magnitude, occupation, business, profession, sex, age, color
and upon many other things, depending upon the purpose of
the statute.
(1) Classification by Population.
Counties, 2 cities,3 and sometimes small units of local gov-
ernment, 4 are classified by population for the purpose of leg-
1. A "geographical location" may be made a principle of classifica-
tion so long as more than one unit may come within the class. For ex-
ample, a law which applies "to all cities on the Mississippi River within
ten miles of the Missouri River which have a population of over five
hundred thousand inhabitants," is special because only one city could
ever come within that classification. See post note 17.
2. State ex rel Dickason v. County Court (1895) 128 Mo. 427, 442,
30 S. W. 103 (an act disposing of the revenue from dramshop licenses
in counties having a population less than fifty thousand inhabitants);
Ex Parte Loving (1903) 178 Mo. 194, 207, 77 S. W. 508 (an act author-
izing c:rcuit courts in counties having a population of over 150,000 in-
habitants to act as a juvenile court) ; State ex rel Harvey v. Sheehan
(1916) 269 Mo. 421, 190 S. W. 864 (an act regulating the fees and
duties of proecuting and circuit attorneys in cities (construed as
counties), which have a population of over five hundred thousand in-
habitants). State ex rel Cave v. Tincher (1914) 258 Mo. 1, 166 S. W.
1028.
3. The classification of cities by population is discussed separately
in Chapter VI, p. 17.
4. State ex inf. Wright v. Morgan (1916) 268 Mo. 265, 187 S. W.
54 (an act authorizing the consolidation of school districts having less
than two hundred children of school age).
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islation. There must always be "some distinguishing pecu-
liarity which gives rise to a necessity for the law as to the
designated class." 5
The classification by population need not be based upon the
total population of the unit of local government in question. In
State ex. inf. Wright v. Morgan6 an act was upheld which au-
thorized the consolidation of school districts having less than two
hundred children of school age. Counties are sometimes classi-
fied according to the population of cities they may adjoin 7 or con-
tain." Such classification is valid so long as the principle upon
which the classification is made bears a reasonable relation to the
purpose of the statute.
Classification by population must have a prospective oper-
ation.5 The class should include in the future all units of local
5. Ex Parte Loving (1903) 178 Mo. 194, 209, 77 S. W. 508 (juvenile
court law).
In Dunne v. K. C. Cable Ry. (1895) 131. Mo. 1, 5, 32 S. W. 641, Mac-
Farlane, J., in upholding a jury law applicable to counties containing over
fifty thousand and less than three hundred thousand population said
(loc. cit. 5, 6); "There must be some distinguishing peculiarity which
gives rise to a necessity for the law as to the designated class....................
"There also appears a reasonable necessity for the classification. The
selection of juries under the general law, in counties containing large
cities, is liable to much abuse. Complaint of the character of juries se-
lected was common. The law was intended to correct this evil, and to
do so the classification was deemed necessary."
6. (1916) 268 Mo. 265, 187 S. W. 54.
7. State ex rel Barker v. Wurdeman (1914) 254 Mo. 561, 163 S. W.
849 (an act creating an excise commission in counties having over sev-
enty five thousand inhabitants which adjoin cities of five hundred thou-
sand inhabitants or more).
8. Dunne v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co. (1895) 131 Mo. 1, 32 S. W. 641
(an act providing for the selection of petit jurors in counties contain-
ing cities over fifty thousand and less than three hundred thousand in-
habitants).
9. State ex rel Board v. County Court of Jackson County (1886)
89 Mo. 237, 1 S. W. 307 (an act which provided that "in all counties of
this state in which is located a city of over fifty thousand inhabitants ........
........................ is hereby established a reform school" was held invalid be-
cause it was "designed to operate in the present and on an existing state
of facts"); State ex rel Wiles v. Williams (1910) 232 Mo. 56, 72, 133
S. W. 1 (an act was held invalid which regulated the salary of prosecu-
ting attorneys "in all counties whose population, as ascertained by the
United States census of 1900, is 32,000 inhabitants or over, and -less than
50,000 inhabitants").
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government of which the classification is made which attain the
prescribed population; and it should exclude all former members
of the class which so increase or decrease in population as to be
no longer within the limits of the class."0 The classification is
usually based upon the federal census taken every ten years,"
but a special enumeration may be authorized during the inter-
vening period.
12
Some cases apply to a limited class of counties of a given
population. In State ex rel. Barker v. Wordeman3 the class
was composed of those counties of a given classification which
adjoin a city of five hundred thousand inhabitants. The statute
in that case created a board of excise commissioners and defined
their duties in counties of the prescribed class. This classifica-
tion can be justified only upon the ground that there is a reason-
able necessity for such legislation with reference to counties
having a population of seventy-five thousand inhabitants or more
10. State ex rel Major v. Ryan (1910) 232 Mo. 77, 133 S. W. 8
(an act regulating selection of petit jurors in counties having cities of
over one and !ess than four hundred thousand inhabitants was held not
to apply to Buchanan County after St. Joseph fell below one hundred
thousand inhabitants in population in 1910).
11. Dunne v. K. C. Cable Ry. (1895) 131 Mo. 1, 7, 8, 32 S. W. 641.
In this case it was contended that a jury law applying to counties hav-
ing cities over fifty and less than three hundred thousand population
"according to the last preceding national census" could not "apply to
all counties of the designated class for the reason that it does not in-
clude such counties as may become entitled to its benefits between one
census and another." The answer of the court to this was: "There must
necessarily be in every case a period of more or less duration in which a
county may in fact be entitled to the benefits of the law before they
can enjoy them ............. The census as a basis possesses the ad-
vantages of certainty in time and accuracy in manner, which are both
difficult to secure when the work is committed to the local authorities of
counties which are dominated by large cities."
12. In Ex Parte Renfrew (1892) 112 Mo. 591, 20 S. W. 682, the
court upheld an act establishing a criminal court in Green county in 1889
under article six, section thirty-one which provided that "the General As-
sembly shall have no power to establish criminal courts, except in coun-
ties having a population exceeding fifty thousand," altho the federal cen-
sus of 1890 as well as the one of 1880 showed a population less than fif-
teen thousand in Green county. The court said that the legislature hav-
ing determined that there were over fifty thousand inhabitants in Green
County when te law was enacted, this was sufficient.
13. (1913) 254 Mo. 561, 163 S. W. 849.
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which adjoin cities of five hundred thousand population or more,
that does not exist in counties having a population of seventy-
five thousand inhabitants or more which do not adjoin cities of
five hundred thousand inhabitants or over, or in counties having
a population of less than seventy-five thousand inhabitants which
may or may not adjoin a large city.
In State ex. inf. Barker v. Southern,14 an act which regulat-
ed the duties of highway engineer in counties containing more
than fifty thousand inhabitants, whose taxable wealth exceeds
forty-five million dollars or which adjoin or contain a city of
more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, was upheld "for
the reason that the counties which should fall within such a class
would naturally have different or greater needs, corresponding
to the differences between their condition and other counties of
less population and less wealth." In all cases where more than
one principle of classification is used the resultant classification
must be justified under a reasonable necessity to avoid being ob-
jectionable as special legislation.
A classification is valid even tho there be only one member
of the class provided that it includes all those units which may
come into the class in the future, and is based upon a difference
which bears a reasonable relation to the object of the act. In
State ex. rel. Barker v. Wordemnan 5 an act was approved by two
judges which applied to all counties of seventy-five thousand in-
habitants or more adjoining a city of five hundred thousand in-
14. (1914) 265 Mo. 275, 177 S. W. 640.
15. (1913) 254 Mo. 561, 163 S. W. 849, Walker, J., (loc. cit. 575),
"The fact that St. Louis county was at the time of said enactment the
only county having a population of 75,000 or more, adjacent to a city
(St. Louis) of 500,000 inhabitants, or more, and that said city was the
only one in the state then .having the designated population does not
render the act obnoxious to the State Constitution in regard to special
legislation. The act under its terms will apply with equal force in the
future to other counties or cities which by increase in their populations
may come within the purview of the statute."
Accord: State ex rel Harvey v. Sheehan (1916) 269 Mo. 421, 190
S. W. 864 (an act regulating the duties of prosecuting or circuit at-
tornies in cities which have a population of five hundred thousand or
more, the court construing city to mean county.)
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habitants or more although it applied only to one county at the
time of its enactment.
Wherever there are two or more principles of classification,
each distinction upon, which the classification is based must bear
a reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute for which the
composite classification is made. The use of two or more prin-
ciples of classification is susceptible to abuse unless each prin-
ciple is scrutinized carefully, since it is possible to reduce any
class to a few members if enough principles are used to elimin-
ate the largest part of the class. In. Hays v. Milling Co. 16 is
found a good example of this evil. In that case an act was held
invalid which regulated the fees of the clerk of circuit courts in
all counties which "constitute a separate judicial circuit with two
judges of the circuit court and having no criminal court." This
description applied to only one county in the state.
(2) Other Principles of Classification.
Any principle or combination of principles of classification
is valid under the constitutional prohibition on special legisla-
tion so long as the distinction or distinctions upon which the
classification is determined bears a reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the classification is made. Classifications
which are valid for one statute may be invalid as to others.
Counties, and other units of local government, may be
classified by geographical location,'17 assessed wealth,18 miles of
16. (1909) 227 Mo. 288, 126 S. W. 1051.
17. State ex rel Barker v. Wurdeman (1913) 254 Mo. 561, 163 S.
W. 849 (an act creating an excise commission in all counties having a
population of over seventy-five thousand inhabitants, adjoining a city
of five hundred thousand inhabitants); State ex rel Kinsey v. Messerly(1906) 198 Mo. 351,.355, 95 S. W. 913 (an act held invalid which regu-
lated fees of justices of the peace in cities having a population of fifteen
thousand and tinder thirty-five thousand inhabitants, lying wholly within
one township, Sedalia being the only city.) A good example of classi-
fication by geographical location would be: "all cities on a river or sea-
shore." A law based upon a geographical classification which could nev-
er apply to more than one locality does not because of such classification
lose its special and local character. See note 1, page 4.
18. State ex inf Barker v. Southern (1915) 265 Mo. 275, 177 S. W.
640 (an act regulating duties of highway engineer in counties contain-
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macadamized and graveled roads, 9 or upon any other distinc-
tion that bears a reasonable relation to the purpose of the act.
The question of the validity of a classification frequently
arises in connection with the exercise of the police power. Laws
promoting the general welfare, convenience, health, safety and
comfort of the state or community are frequently attacked upon
the ground of special legislation. Laws applying to corpora-
tiLfns,2 ° railroads,21 insurance .companies,2 2 industries, 2 hours
ing over fifty thousand inhabitants, whose taxable wealth exceeds forty-
five million dollars or which adjoin or contain a city of more than one
hundred thousand inhabitants.)
19. State ex rel Garrett v. Arnold (1896) 136 Mo. 446, 38 S. W.
640 (an act authorizing a higher rate of taxation for road improvements
in "all counties wherein the assessed valuation of property is fifteen mil-
lion dollars or more, and wherein there are more than one hundred and
fifty miles of macadamized and graveled roads.")
20. Julian v. K. C. Star (1908) 209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (uphold-
ing an act which authorized suits for libel against a newspaper corpo-
ration in any county of the state where the paper circulates in which
neither plaintiff nor defendant resided.) This case was subsequently
overruled in McClung v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. (1919) 214 S. W. 193 in which
McBaine, Special Judge, said (loc. cit. 196): "So, then, we conclude that
since the decision in Houston v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 249 Mo. 332,
155 S. W. 1068, decided April 8, 1913, this court has been of the opinion
that the legislature has not the authority under the state and federal
constitutions to provide that the venue in libel suits shall be that the
individual charged with libel may only be sued in the county where he
resides, or where the plaintiff resides if the individual is there found,
but that in the case of a corporation charged with libel the corporation
defendant may be sued in a county in this state where neither the action
accrued nor the corporation has its domicile or agent for the transac-
tion of business, and that the legislature may not provide that a citizen
of the state, who is plaintiff in a libel suit, can sue a corporate defend-
ant charged with libel in the county where the citizen resides, while a
citizen, as plaintiff, who charges an individual defendant with committing
a libel, cannot sue the defendant in the county in which the plaintiff re-
sides, unless the individual defendant shall be found in the county where
the plaintiff resides."
21. See post p. 11.
22. Daggs v. Ins. Co. (1896) 136 Mo. 382, 38 S. W. 85 (an act up-
held which denied the right to fire insurance companies of showing that
the property insured was worth less at the time of issuing the policy
than the full amount insured); State ex inf. Crow v. Aetna Ins. Co.
(1899) 150 Mo. 113, 51 S. W. 413 (holding an act valid prohibiting com-
binations fixing rates of fire insurance in the state except in cities hav-
ing a population of over one hundred thousand inhabitants) ; Jenkins v.
Ins. Co. (1902) 171 Mo. 375, 71 S. W. 688 (upholding an act depriving
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and conditions of labor, 24 occupations, 25 and other classes of per-
sons, things, or acts, 26 in the state are upheld if there is a rea-
sonable relation between the distinction upon which the classi-
fication is based and the object of the statute.
old line insurance companies of defense of misrepresentation unless the
matter misrepresented contributed to the event on which the policy was
payable) ; Claudy v. Royal League (1914) 259 Mo. 92, 168 S. W. 593,
(upholding an act excepting fraternal beneficiary associations from the
provisions of the insurance laws including the act denying defense of
suicide to insurance companies.)
23. Haman v. Coke Co. (1900) 156 Mo. 232, 56 S. W. 1091, Bur-
gess, J., upholding an act authorizing the recovery by the wife of ten
thousand dollars for the death of her husband, a miner, caused by the
negligence of defendant mine operator in the course of his employment,
altho the statute allowed the recovery of a maximum of five thousand
dollars in all other cases, said (loc. cit. 241) : "It is common knowledge
that no class of laborers are so much exposed to dangers as miners, and
that none in proportion to the number engaged meet with so many fatal
disasters, and the legislature doubtless for that reason, in order to pro-
tect human life, and to prevent such occurences so far as possible, thought
that the necessity for increasing the maximum amount of damages over
that fixed by law in other cases existed, in order to stimulate operators
of such mines to all needful and proper precaution for their protection."
24. Statc v. Whitaker (1900) 160 Mo. 59, 70, 60 S. W. 1068 (uphold-
ing an act requiring screens for the protection of motormen on street
electric railways and not applying to tramways propelled by other
means) ; State v. Cantwell (1903) 179 Mo. 245, 78 S. W. 569 (holding
valid an eight hour law for miners) ; Hawkins v. Smith (1912) 242 Mo.
688, 147 S. WA. 1042 (holding valid a law abolishing the defence of neg-
ligence of a fellow servant in an action against a mine operator for per-
sonal injury to a miner) ; State v. Miksicek (1909) 225 Mo. 561, 125 S.
W. 507 (holding invalid an act prohibiting work in bakeries over six
days per week and regulating the construction of bakeries so as to ob-
tain light and air.)
25. Ex Porte Lucas (1900) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 218 (an act reg-
ulating the occupation of barbering in cities having a population of over
fifty thousand inhabitants); State v. Weber (1908) 214 Mo. 272, 113 S.
W. 1054 (upholding an act requiring peddlers of certain goods to have a
license.)
26. State v. Bockstruck (1896) 136 Mo. 335, 354, 38 S. W. 317 (an
act prohibiting the sale of imitation butter) ; State v. Gritzner (1896) 134
Mo. 512, 528, 36 S. W. 39 (an act forbidding "dealing in options"); Ex
Parte Berger (1905) 193 Mo. 16, 90 S. W. 759 (upheld an act which
punished the receiving of interest in excess of two per cent per month,
the legal rate of interest being eight per cent) ; Spithover v. Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n. (1909) 225 Mo. 660, 125 S. W. 766 (upholding an act permit-
ting building and loan associations to collect from members the equivalent
of a rate of interest above the legal rate, thru premiums, fines, and inter-
est) ; White v. Railroad (1910) 230 Mo. 387, 130 S. W. 325 (an act held
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Laws applying to railroads have long been upheld as proper
altho such laws do not apply to all corporations or all common
carriers. In Humes v. Mo. Pac. Ry.27 an act was upheld which
allowed double damages to be recovered against a railroad for
the killing of stock in consequence of a failure to fence the right
of way.28  This was a valid exercise of the police power.2 9
The constitutionality of acts making classifications is fre-
quently attacked under the provisions in the state constitution
valid which prohibited a garnishment of the wages of employees of rail-
roads in actions for sums less than two hundred dollars before final
judgment had been recovered against the employee) ; Bank v. Clark
(1913) 252 Mo. 20, 158 S. W. 597 (upholding an act restricting the right
of protest for street improvements to resident owners of abutting prop-
erty); State v. Iron & Steel Co. (1916) 268 Mo. 178, 186 S. W. 1007
(upholding an act regulating the sanitary conditions of foundries em-
ploying more than ten men.)
27. (1884) 82 Mo. 221, 230.
28. Accord: Dent v. Railroad (1884) 83 Mo. 496 (holding valid an
act which conferred jurisdiction upon justice of the peace courts of cases
against railroads for stock killed due to a failure to fence the right of
way) ; Kingsbury v. Railroad (1900) 156 Mo. 379, 57 S. W. 547 (allow-
ing double damage to be recovered against the railroad whose failure
.to maintain a good fence along the right of way caused injury to crops.)
29. Perkins v. Railroad (1890) 103 Mo. 52, 15 S. W. 320, Black, J.,
in upholding an act which allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to a suc-
cessful plaintiff in an action against a railroad for the killing of live
stock at places on the right of way not enclosed by a good fence, said
(loc. cit. 57) : "Our statute giving the owner double damages for stock
killed where a railroad is not fenced as required by law, has been upheld
in several cases on the ground that the law is a police regulation and de-
signed not only to protect the owners of the stock, but also the travel-
ling public, and that the legislature might impose a penalty for a viola-
tion of the law and give the penalty to the owner of the stock killed.
Barrett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56, and cases cited; Cummings v. Railroad,
70 Mo. 570; Spealman v. Railroad 71 Mo. 434; Humes v. Railroad, supra.
The statute in question is as much a police regulation as is the double
damage section; and the attorneys' fee may be lawfully imposed as a
penalty for the violation of the law. It is a penalty allowed in all cases
of a class, and the objection that the law is special legislation is not well
taken." Affirmed in Briggs v. Railroad (1892) 111 Mo. 168, 172: 20 S.
W. 32. Powell v. Sherwood (1901) 162 Mo. 605, 617, 63 S. W. 485 (up-
holding an act abolishing the defense of the negligence of a ("fellow
.servant" in an action against a railroad by an employee for personal in-
juries) ; Sams v. Railroad (1902) 174 Mo. 53, 73 S. W. 686 (holding
that act abolishing defense of "fellow servant" by railroads was not spe-
cial because it did not apply to street railways) ; State v. Railroad (1912)
242 Mo. 339, 147 S. W. 118 (upholding an act which required corpora-
tions to pay employees at least twice each month.)
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against special legislation and under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States requiring equal protec-
tion of the laws. An act objectionable under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United State is objection-
able under the State Constitution as special legislation. But the
converse is not true as is pointed out in another place. The
scope of this study does not permit a full discussion of all the
problems of classification, especially the problems of classifica-
tion arising under the exercise of the police power.30
It is sometimes said that the "mere form of legislation
30. In the following cases the acts were held special and unconsti-
tutional: State v. lulow (1895) 129 Mo. 163, 176, 31 S. W. 781 (an act
forbidding the discharge of an employee because he belongs to the union
was held special because it did not protect non-union men from being
discharged) ; State v. Granneman (1896) 132 Mo. 326, 33 S. W. 784 (an
act forbidding the carrying on of barber business on Sunday) ; In re
Flukes (1900.) 157 Mo. 125, 57 S. W. 545 (prohibiting a resident creditor
from garnishing the wages of a resident debtor in another state because
it prevents a right of garnishment abroad that might be exercised at
home) ; State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn (1901) 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W.
592 (holding invalid an act requiring the governor in appointing a board
of three election commissioners in cities having over one hundred thou-
sand inhabitants to select one from the leading party opposed to the
governor from three candidates nominated by the party committee of
the city for which the board is appointed) ; Moler v. Whisman (1912) 243
Mo. 571, 147 S. W. 985 (holding invalid an act which forbade barber
colleges from displaying a barber pole and prohibited apprentices or
students from charging for their services); State v. Walsh (1896) 136
Mo. 400, 406, 37 S. W. 1112 (an act prohibiting pool selling and book
making in any place except upon the premises of a regular race course
was held invalid because there was no reasonable basis for distinguish-
ing pool selling and bookmaking off the premises from the same acts
upon the premises of a regular race course). Affirmed: State v. Thomas
(1896) 138 Mo. 95, 100, 39 S. W. 481. The decisions in these cases
were later obviated by an act which required that bookmakers should
be licensed al: race courses by the auditor of the state. State v. Thomp-
son (1900) 160 Mo. 333, 346, 60 S. W. 1077. State v. Buchardt (1898)
144 Mo. 83, 46 S. W. 150 (holding an act unconstitutional which punish-
ed petit larceny by a heavier penalty in St. Louis than elsewhere in the
state.)
State v. Kring (1881) 74 Mo. 612, 622 (an act which regulated the
selection of special judges in the criminal court of St. Louis held invalid
as a special :act regulating the practice and procedure in judicial pro-
ceedings) ; State v. Baskowitz (1913) 250 Mo. 82, 156 S. W. 945 (hold-
ing invalid an act requiring the written consent of the owner of certain
kinds of bottles which bear a trade name to be obtained by dealers of
the same).
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without regard to its operation will not suffice to relieve it of
its special or local character. If in its practical operation it can
only apply to particular persons or things of a class then it will
be a special or local law, however its character may be conceal-
ed by form of words." 31 This means that the validity of a
classification with respect to a given law is determined by its op-
eration and not by its form; and that the classification as it
actually works out must be based upon a difference which bears a
reasonable relation to the object of the statute. And in the same
case from which the above quotation was taken, Dunne v. K. C.
Cable Ry., a further statement is made in support of this view:
"If the classification is a proper one, the law -ill not be special
or local, tho at the time only one object falls within the class,
provided the law has such a prospective application as to include
all objects that may, in the future, become entitled to the bene-
fits or powers conferred by the law." 32
The General Assembly cannot create a classification upon
differences in counties which differences exist by reason of an
act of the legislature. To uphold such laws would be to per-
mit the legislature to enact special laws indirectly by creating or
destroying the distinctions ,upon which the classifications are
based. In State ex. inf. Barker v. Southern3 an act was held
invalid which regulated the duties of the county surveyor in
all counties which contain two hundred and less than four hun-
dred thousand inhabitants, and which contain one hundred and
fifty miles or more of macadamized roads outside of municipal
corporations, "which pay to the county surveyor a salary of three
31. Dunne v. K. C. Cable Ry. (1895) 131 Mo. 1, 5, 32 S. W. 641.
32. (1895) 131 Mo. 1, 6, 32 S. W. 641. In this case an act provid-
ing for the selection of the jury in counties which had a city containing
more than fifty and less than three hundred thousand inhabitants was
upheld altho only two counties came under the provisions of the act at
the time of its enactment.
33. (1915) 265 Mo. 275, 177 S. W. 640. Accord: Hays v. Mining
and Milling Co. (1909) 227 Mo. 288, 126 S. W. 1051. (An act regulating
fees of clerk of circuit court in all counties which "constitute a separate
judicial circuit with two judges of the circuit court and having no crim-
inal court") ; affirmed: Bridges v. Holdout Mining Co., 252 Mo. 53, 158
S. W. 579.
LAW SERIES 20, MISSOURI BULLETIN
thousand dollars or more annually." In this case the legisla-
ture could include or exclude a county which otherwise would
come within the class changing the pay of the county surveyor.
The court based its decision upon the ground that no other
county or counties could come within the class as the classifi-
cation is based upon an existing state of facts. A classification
based upon a distinction which derives its existence from an act
of the legislature is necessarily a classification based upon an
existing fact.
B. ENACTMENT OF LOCAL AND SPECIAL LAWS.
(1) In Pursuance of a Provision of the Constitution.
A local or special act passed in pursuance of a specific con-
stitutional provision is valid. The prohibition against local and
special legislation does not apply to such acts. An act which
appoints the times and places for the holding of circuit courts
in a designated judicial district is not invalid,3 4 altho special
and local, since the constitution provides that the circuit court
"shall hold its terms at such times and places in each county as
may be by law directed." 15 In Ex Parte Renfrow" an act was
upheld which created a criminal court in Green County under
section thirty-one of article six of the constitution which pro-
vided: "The General Assembly shall have no power to estab-
lish criminal courts except in counties having a population ex-
ceeding fifty thousand." Wherever the constitution authorizes
the passage of a law it is not invalid if local or special.37
34. State ex rel Hughlett v. Hughes (1891) 104 Mo. 459 (an act pro-
viding for the times and places of holding circuit courts in Audrain, Pike,
Lincoln, and Montgomery counties) ; affirmed: State ex rel Younger v.
Stratton (1896) 136 Mo. 423.
35. Const. of 1875, Art. VI, Sec. 22.
36. (1892) 112 Mo. 591, 598, 20 S. W. 682; affirmed: State ex rel
Donhan v. Yancey (1894) 123 Mo. 391, 27 S. W. 380; State v. Etchman
(1905) 189 Mo. 648, 88 S. W. 643. But an act which imposes duties
upon any judge of a criminal court not a part of that office, as an act
requiring the judge of the criminal court of Buchanan county to sit, when
called upon, over courts in any circuit in the state trying civil and crim-
inal cases, is unconstitutional. State v. Hill (1898) 147 Mo. 63, 47 S. W.
798; Ashbrook v. Schaub (1900) 160 Mo. 107, 110, 160 S. W. 107.
37. In the following cases local and special acts were upheld under
LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION
(2) Under Section Fifty-Four.
It is provided in section fifty-four of article four that "no
local or special law shall be passed unless notice of the intention
to apply therefor shall have been published in the locality where
the matter or thing to be affected is situated." 3 It is required
that the notice shall state the substance of the contemplated law,
and be published at least thirty days prior to the introduction of
the bill in the legislature.
In Todd v. Reynoldss9 a local and special act, which pro-
a specific provision in the constitution authorizing such legislation:
Kenefick v. St. Louis (1895) 127 Mo. 1, 29 S. W. 838 (an act limiting
the compensation of the sheriff in the city of St. Louis to ten thousand
dollars under Art. IX, Sec. 13, Const. of 1875, which provided that "the
fees of no executive or ministerial officer of any county or municipality,
................ shall exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars for any one year") ;
State ex inf. Atty. Gen. v. Dobbs (1904) 182 Mo. 359, 365, 81 S. W. 1148
(an act providing for an additional circuit judge in Jasper county);
Coffey v. Carthage (1906) 200 Mo. 616, 98 S. W. 562 (an act in relation
to the twenty-fifth judicial district dividing the court into two divisions
and providing for two judges) ; State ex rel Judah v. Fort (1908) 210
Mo. 512, 109 S. W. 737 (an act creating two divisions for the Criminal
Court of Jackson County). State ex rel Lionberger v. Tolle (1880) 71
Mo. 645 (an act requiring judges of circuit courts in cities having a
population of one hundred thousand inhabitants or more to award to the
newspaper which is the lowest bidder all legal notices was upheld under
Art. VI, Sec. 27, of the Constitution which provided that the judges of
the circuit court of St. Louis "may sit in general term ---------- for the
transaction of such other business as may be provided by law") ; State
v. Brown (1880) 71 Mo. 454 (an act adding Cairo township to the juris-
diction of the common pleas court of Moberly upheld under section five
of the schedule of the Constitution which provided that all courts of
common pleas shall continue to exist and exercise their present juris-
diction until otherwise provided by law).
38. Article IV, Section 54, Const. of Mo., provides as follows:
"Sec. 54. Local and special laws, notice of....No local or special law
shall be passed unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have
been published in the locality where the matter or thing to-be affected
may be situated, which notice shall state the substance of the contem-
plated law, and shall be published at least thirty days prior to the introduc-
tion into the General Assembly of such bill, and in the manner to be
provided by law. The evidence of such notice having been published
shall be exhibited in the General Assembly before such act shall be pass-
ed, and the notice shall be recited in the act according to its tenor."
39. (1917) 199 S. W. 173. The same act was upheld in a prev-
ious case, Lampel Land Co. v. Spellings (1911) 236 Mo. 33, 139 S. W.
347.
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vided that the "Chas. H. Groom Abstracts," relating to and af-
fecting the titles of real real estate in Taney county, "shall be
received as prima facie evidence of the matter and entries there-
in contained, in all courts and places in this state, ' 40 was upheld
under section fifty-four of article four, all of the formalties re-
quired by this section being complied with. This act was held
not to be in contravention of section fifty-three of article four
of the constitution. It was not in conflict with the subdivisions
enumerating prohibited subjects of special legislation. Neither
was it regarded as being in conflict with the provision that no
local or special law shall be passed where a general law can be
made applicable. The necessity for the special act in this case
was the loss of all records and abstracts of the conveyance of
real estate in Taney county in the destruction of the court house
of Taney county in 1885, except the "Chas. H. Groom Ab-
stracts." 41
A local or special law upon any of the enumerated subjects
in section fifty-three, concerning which local and special laws
are forbidden, does not become valid by reason of enactment
in pursuance of the provisions of section fifty-four;42 and sec-
tion fifty-four does not authorize the enactment of a local and
special law where a general law could have been made applic-
able.48 Section fifty-four merely provides a method whereby
those local and special laws which are not upon subjects for-
bidden by section fifty-three, or upon a subject which a general
law could not have been made applicable, may be enacted.
40. Missouri Laws, 1905, p. 148.
41. In 1907 a general law making abstract of titles competent evi-
dence wherever the official records had been destroyed was passed.
Missouri Laws, 1907 p. 271. The soundness of the decision in Todd v.
Reynolds, it is submitted, depends upon whether a general law could have
been made applicable. Apparently the court accepted the determination
by the legislature of this question as reasonable.
42. State v. Kring (1881) 74 Mo. 612, 623.
43. Todd v. Reynolds (1917) 199 S. W. 173, Railey, C., (loc. cit.
175): "Section 54 of the above article of our Constitution clearly con-
templates that a local.or special law may be passed by complying with
its provisions, provided it does not contravene any of the provisions of
section 53, supra."
LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION
If a local or special act has been enacted under the pro-
visions of section fifty-four, it can be amended only by compli-
ance with all the formalities required in the first instance." But
such an act may be repealed, it seems, without complying with
the requirements of section fifty-four.45  If a local act is pass-
ed in compliance with section fifty-four, and also in pursuance
of a grant of power conferred upon the legislature by the con-
stitution, such law may be amended as any other law since the
compliance with section fifty-four was unnecessary. The val-
idity of the law depends upon the specific grant of power by
the constitution, and not because of compliance with section
fifty-four. 46
Chapter, VI. Classification of Cities.
A. CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE CONSTI-
TUTION.
(1) The Four Classes of Cities Organized Under General Laws.
Cities may be properly classified for the purposes of reg-
ulation by general laws upon the basis of population. The jus-
tification for such classification lies in the difference of needs of
44. Ashbrook v. Schaub (1901) 160 Mo. 107, 110, 60 S. W. 1085.
45. In Todd v. Reynolds (1917) 199 S. W. 173 it was contended the
subsequent general act, mentioned in note four, repealed the local and
special act. It was held that the general act did not repeal the special
act, but it was intimated that the Legislature could have repealed the
special act.
46. State ex rel Donhan v. Yancy (1894) 123 Mo. 391, 27 S. W.
380. The act involved in this case was an amendment to an act creat-
ing a criminal court in Greene county. The original act complied with
all the requirements of section fifty-four, but the amendment did not.
The amendment was sustained, however, under section thirty-one of
article six which authorized the legislature to establish criminal courts
in counties having a population of fifty thousand inhabitants or over.
In delivering the opinion of the court, Burgess, J., said (loc. cit. 401):
"The fact that notice was given of the intended application to the legis-
lature for the passage of a law creating the court in question and of a
court similar in all respects in Buchanan county did not change the law
and was in all probability done thru an abundance of caution, certainly
not because it was a necessary prerequisite."
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cities of different population, and in a similarity of problems
in the cities of the same size. Laws applicable to the creation
of an organization and of powers in a small town are unsuited
to perform a similar function for the government of large
cities; but cities of the same size have so much in common that
general laws defining their powers and organization are recog-
nized as adequate to their similar needs.'
The classification of cities is authorized and required by
the Constitution of Missouri. Section seven of article nine reads:
"The General Assembly shall provide, by general laws, for the
organization and classification of cities and towns. The num-
ber of such classes shall not exceed four; and the powers of
each class shall be defined by general laws, so that all such muni-
cipal corporations of the same class shall possess the same pow-
ers and be subject to the same restrictions. The General As-
sembly shall also make provision, by general law, whereby any
city, town or village, existing by virtue of any special or local
law, may elect to become subject to and be governed by the
general laws relating to such corporations."
The Legislature, acting under this constitutional mandate,
in the first session after adoption of the Constitution of 1875,
divided the cities and towns of Missouri into four classes.
2
1. Dillon, Mun. Corp., Secs. 147-151.
2. Missouri Laws, Twenty-ninth Session (1877), p. 41. All cities
containing one hundred thousand inhabitants or more constituted the
first class; all cities containing twenty and less than one hundred thou-
sand, the second class; all cities and towns containing five and less than
twenty thousand, the third class, and all cities and towns containing five
hundred and less than five thousand inhabitants constituted the fourth
class. The Missouri Laws of 1885, p. 50, changed the division between
the second and third classes from twenty to thirty thousand inhabitants.
Subsequently the dividing line between the third and fourth classes was
changed from a population of five to three thousand inhabitants. R. S.
1889, Secs. 974, 975. This amended classification still holds today (R. S.
1909, Secs. 8524-8527) with the addition that all unincorporated towns
containing less than five hundred are declared villages (R. S. 1909, Sec.
8528) ; and with the provisions that all incorporated towns under five
hundred inhabitants which shall so elect shall be cities of the fourth
class (R. S. 1909, Sec. 8527), and that all cities containing more than
seventy-five and less than one hundred fifty thousand inhabitants may be-
come a city of the first class upon a vote at a special election (R. S. 1909,
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Laws defining the powers and organization of the cities of each
class have been passed and there is no question of their con-
stitutionality. It is with laws concerning the powers of cities
which do not comply with this classification and which are not
coextensive with the limits of a given class that the question
of constitutionality most frequently arises.
It will be noted that the constitutional provision requiring
the classification of cities provides that the general assembly
shall provide for the organization and define the "power of each
class" by general laws, and that all the cities "of the same class
shall possess the same powers and be subject to the same re-
strictions. 13  The effect of this provision has been not only to
produce uniformity of organization and powers within each
class of cities, but also to set apart each class from the others
by well defined limits. Thus a law which grants a power to any
one of the four defined classes of cities is recognized as general
and valid even tho there may be no reasonable distinction be-
tween the cities of the favored class from the cities in any other
class with respect to the power granted.' On principle such a
Secs. 8535-8536). The latter provision which was applicable to St. Jo-
seph alone at the time was upheld in State ex rel Halsey v. Clayton
(1909) 226 Mo. 292, 126 S. W. 506, on the ground that the statute merely
provided a different method by which cities having over seventy-five and
less than one hundred thousand inhabitants could become members of the
first class. Those over one hundred thousand inhabitants had to become
members of the first class whether they so chose or not.
3. Const. of Mo., Art. IX, Sec. 7.
4. Copeland v. St. Joseph (1894) 126 Mo. 417, 429, 29 S. W. 281;
Dillon, Mun. Corp., Sec. 151. In Copeland v. St. Joseph the court held
an act which authorized cities of the second class to extend their limits,
with the proviso that land in lots of three acres or more devoted to
agricultural purposes should be exempted from municipal taxation when
thus included within the extended boundaries was not objectionable be-
cause the proviso was limited in operation to cities of the second class.
The words of Gantt, P. J., who delivered the opinion of the court, are
as follows: (loc. cit. 429)
"In view of all this contemporaneous legislation showing conclu-
sively that the legislature has not hesitated to confer upon cities of all
grades this power of self-extension without. attempting to exempt such
lands, counsel for respondent argues that there is little left upon which
to base a presumption that the legislature would have denied the power
to cities of the second class, unless the proviso had been inserted in the
act. We confess we can see no reason why this power should be denied
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law would be valid only when based upon a classification aris-
ing out of a reasonable necessity; but laws relating to the or-
ganization and powers of a class of cities are not so tested.5
Those acts, however, which do not provide for the organiza-
tion and powers of cities of a given class, are not necessarily
general because they apply to all cities of one of the recognized
classes. Such acts are general only when the class to which they
apply is determined by a reasonable distinction which relates
directly to the object of the statute. Neither are these acts re-
quired to follow the lines of classification of the four general
classes of cities; nor are such acts invalid when they split a class
in violation of the requirement that all powers of each class
shall be the same.6
one class of cities and be conferred upon all others. In either case it
subjects the property so taken in, to municipal taxation.
"On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the legislature had the
unquestioned right to withhold the power of extension altogether, and
necessarily the right to annex the conditions upon which it would confer
the power, and the very fact that it granted the right to all other cities,
and denied it to cities of the second class refutes the presumption that
the proviso was immaterial or inadvertent."
5. Stale ex inf. Atty. Gen. v. Fleming (1898) 147 Mo. 1, 13, 44 S
W. 758 (an election law applicable to cities of the fourth class upheld
altho it virtually did away with the Australian ballot law as to elections
in cities of the fourth class for extension of boundaries). See Dillon
Mun. Corp. Sec. 151.
6. In Calland v. Springfield (1914) 264 Mo. 296, Loc. cit. 302, 174
S. W. 396, Bond, J., in upholding a tax rate in those cities having over
thirty thousand inhabitants which were in the third class, at a higher
rate than was permitted in cities of the third class having less than
thirty thousand inhabitants, under authority of Article X, section eleven
of the Constitution said:
"The other section (Art. 9, Sec. 7) after referring to the Legislature
the duty of providing 'for the organization and classification of cities
and towns' and limiting these to four, adds, to-wit:
" 'And the powers of each class shall be defined by general laws, so
that all such municipal corporations of the same class shall possess the
same powers and be subject to the same restrictions.'
"This general language of the Constitution is necessarily referable
to the objects had in view, that is the organization and division of all
cities and towns into four classes. Therefore in providing that when thus
classified they should have similar powers and be under similar restric-
tions, the Constitution plainly referred to the constituent agencies and
eovernmental functions which necessarily composed 'the organization'
of the cities and towns as a body politic under a particular class."
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A law which grants powers to cities of a given class and
provides that any city of the class may exercise the power upon
election to do so, either by the voters or officials of the city, is
general in nature. 7  It is a form of the local option acts dis-
cussed in another place. Neither is such an act invalid under
the requirements that all cities of the same class shall have the
same powers and be subject to the same restrictions.8 In Owen
v. Baer, 9 three judges of a divided court held a local option
drainage and sewer act for cities of the third and fourth class
unconstitutional on the ground that it created "a dissimilarity
in the powers of the cities of the fourth class." It was con-
tended that cities which accepted the provisions of the act had
greater powers than those which rejected its provisions. Since
this view was not the view of a majority of the court in Owen v.
Baer, the court in Hall v. Sedalia ° did not hesitate to repu-
diate this theory in holding that a local option sewer law for
cities of the third class was constitutional.
(2) Cities Operating Under Special Charters.
The question arose a few years after the adoption of the
Constitution of 1875 as to the validity of legislation applying to
cities operating under special charters. It was held in Ruth-
erford v. Heddens that a law which authorized cities operat-
7. Barnes v. Kirksville (1915) 266 Mo. 270, 180 S. W. 545 (an act
providing commission form of city government for cities of the third
class selecting it).
8. Hall v. Sedalia (1910) 232 Mo. 344, 134 S. W. 650. Ferriss, J.,
in giving the opinion of the court, said (loc. cit. 352): "The act in ques-
tion is complete in itself, and is uniform in its application to cities of
the third class, comprehends all cities of that class. Whether the law
shall come into operation in any particular city depends upon a contin-
gency, namely, an affirmative vote of the people of such city. But this
applies to each and every city of the class. The law extends the same
right, the same privilege, to each city in the class, and is therefore uni-
form. It is, in the language of the Constitution, a 'general' law, and
under it all the cities of the same class, as required by the Constitution,
'possess the same powers and are subject to the same restrictions.'
9. (1900) 154 Mo. 434, 55 S. W. 644.
10. (1910) 232 Mo. 344, 352, 134 S. W. 650.
11. (1884) 82 Mo. 388. Affirmed in Rutherford v. Hamilton (1888)
97 Mo. 543, 11 S. W. 249. The act involved authorized the citics in the
class designated to establish a system of sewerage.
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ing under special charters that contained more than thirty and
less than fifty thousand inhabitants to establish a sewer system
was general and constitutional. Thus was recognized a fifth
class of cities, namely, those operating under special charters.
Also as a further result of Rutherford v. Heddons, laws which
apply only to a portion of the cities operating under special
charters may be held to be general.' 2 It is believed that legisla-
tion for sub-classes of the general class of cities with special
charters is valid only when such sub-classification rests upon a
reasonable difference that relates to the object sought by the
statute for which the sub-classification was made.
(3) Cities with "Home Rule" Charters.
Other constitutional provisions which have given rise to
two separate classifications of cities are contained in article
nine. Sections sixteen and seventeen provide for the adoption
by cities having more than one hundred thousand inhabitants of
their own. charters; and section twenty and the following sec-
tions in article nine provide a method by which St. Louis alone
may adopt its own charter. Under these sections acts applying
to St. Louis or the other "home rule" cities are upheld on the
theory that two new classes of cities are created; one class com--
posed of all "home rule" charter cities except St. Louis, and the
other class composed of St. Louis alone."S
Statutes which designate St. Louis directly by name, or in-
12. Kelly v. Meeks (1885) 87 Mo. 396 (an act authorizing cities
with special charters having more than twenty and less than two hun-
dred and fifty thousand inhabitants to extend their limits) : Elling v.
Hickman (1902) 172 Mo. 237, 72 S. W. 700 (an act authorizing ihe or-
ganization of special road districts of territory in which were cities ot
the third and fourth classes except those cities of the third class having
special charters). In Elting v. Hickman, Burgess, J., said (loc. cit.
256): "It is therefore plain that cities which retain their special char.-
ters do not belong to either of the classes provided for by the Constitution,
altho they may have the requisite number of inhabitants to become such,
unless they first elect to do so."
13. Kansas City v. Stegmiller (1899) 151 Mo. 189, 52 S. W. 72S.
Gantt, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said (loc. cit. 204):
"Again we think it is plain that the framers of the Constitution ex vi
termini excluded from its legislative classification the City of St. Louis,
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directly by classification as "all cities having a population of
over five hundred thousand inhabitants," 14 are upheld on the
theory that St. Louis under the constitutional provisions consti-
tutes a separate class. If St. Louis were not recognized as con-
stituting a separate class to herself then such laws relating to the
powers and organization of cities over five hundred thousand
would be invalid under the constitutional provision that all cities
of the same class should possess the same powers and be subject
to the same restrictions. Such statutes, however, as define the
powers and organization of the city of St. Louis, directly or
indirectly, must be based upon the peculiar needs of St. Louis,
as distinguished from the needs of other cities having home rule
or of the first class. The "home rule" cities and St. Louis are
recognized as separate classes, it is submitted, only when there
is a reasonable necessity for such classification. The validity
of laws concerning St. Louis alone designated directly or in-
directly, are tested by the same requirement that there must be
a reasonable necessity for such classification to accomplish the
object of the statute.
In Murnane v. St. Louis 5 an act which regulated the as-
sesment for street improvements in cities having more than three
which it expressly authorized to adopt its own scheme and charter, and
all such cities as it authorized by Section 16 Article IX, to frame and
adopt their own charters. These cities constitute two constitutional
classes distinct from those chartered and classified by the legislature."
The cases in the Supreme Court of Missouri upon this question are
reviewed in McBain, Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule, pp.
118-171.
14. In State ex rel Hawes v. Mason (1899) 153 Mo. 23, 54 S. W.
524, Gantt, C. J., in upholding an act "providing for the creation and
organization in all cities having three hundred thousand inhabitants and
over, of a board of police commissioners" said (loc. cit. 52) : "So much
of the argument indulged in to demonstrate that the act under consid-
eration is a local and not a general law, is inapplicable to legislation of
this character. St. Louis is organized directly under the Constitution.
It is not in any one of the four classes of cities which have been de-
fined by the legislature under the Constitution. It would have been en-
tirely appropriate for the Legislature to have designated St. Louis by
name instead of referring to it as a city of over three hundred thousand
inhabitants."
15. (1894) 123 Mo. 479, 27 S. W. 711. The court also found that
there was no distinguishing peculiarity giving rise to a necessity for
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hundred thousand inhabitants was held unconstitutional because
it was not a general law applying to all cities of the first class.
namely, to those first class cities having one hundred thousand
inhabitants or over. The court said it created a fifth class of
cities in violation of the provision that the legislature should di-
vide the cities in nbt to exceed four classes. This reasoning was
followed in St. Louis v. Dorr 6 in which a boulevard act appli-
cable to cities having more than three hundred thousand inhabi-
tants was held unconstitutional. Sherwood, J., dissented from
the decision in the latter case on several points one of which was
that such act did not violate the constitutional requirement that
all cities should be divided into four classes by creating a fifth
class; that St. Louis under the constitution constituted a sep-
arate class concerning which valid laws might be passed."
This view of Sherwood, J., later was adopted by the court
in Kansas City v. Stegmiller I and in State ex. rel. Hawes v.
Mason.19  In the latter case a law providing for a Board of
Police Commissioners in cities having more than three hundred
thousand inhabitants was upheld. It is difficult to justify the
decision and doctrine of the Nurnane case with subsequent
cases and it is not believed that it is the law today. Sherwood
J., distinguished these cases a few years later on the theory that
the law as to the designated class and that the classification was based
upon an existing state of facts. Burgess, J., and Sherwood, J., dissent-
ed.
16. (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 46 S. W. 976. Accord: Kansas City ex rel
Dist. v. Scarritt (1894) 127 Mo. 642, 29 S. W. 845.
17. (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 499, 46 S. W. 976. Sherwood, J., referring
to section seven of article nine of Constitution authorizing the division
of cities into not to exceed four classes, said (loc. cit. 499) : "But it is
enough to say of such section that it has nothing whatever to do with
-the City of St. Louis, since that city is by the Constitution singled out
and segregated from all other cities in this State, by express mention
by name, as well as by peculiar and express provisions, shared by no
other city."
18. (1899) 151 Mo. 189, 52 S. W. 723.
19. (1899) 153 Mo. 23, 52, 54 S. W. 524. Accord: Bambrick Bros.
Const. Co. v. Realty Co. (1917) 193 S. W. 543 (an act regulating en-
forcement of liens for street improvements in cities having more than
three hundred thousand inhabitants).
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legislation concerning St. Louis alone, or cities having "home
rule" charters as a class,. was valid only when a general law
could not have been made applicable.20 It is submitted that the
City of St. Louis and the other cities operating under "home
rule" charters constitute two separate classes of cities under the
constitution in addition to the four classes created by the general
assembly acting under the constitution and the class of cities
having special charters; and that these two classes of cities are
proper classifications for laws defining powers and organization
of these cities only so long as there is a reasonable necessity for
such classification. It will be noted that the laws concerning the
four classes differ from the laws concerning the two classes of
"home rule" cities in that laws defining the powers and organiza-
tion of the cities of any of the four classes are always proper re-
gardless of necessity of such classification under the doctrine of
Copeland v. St. Joseph.
The power of the legislature operating under "home rule"
charters is restricted to matters of general or public concern to
the state; and the legislature cannot regulate by a general law
the affairs of purely local concern of those cities having "home
rule." 21 Lamm, J., made an excellent statement of the law on
this point in Brunn v. Kansas City.
22
20. Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356, 68 S. W. 72, 57 L. R. A.
659. Sherwood, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said (loc. cit.
376): "But the assertion is made that cases have been decided by this
court where local or special legislation, that is to say, legislation appli-
cable alone to the city of St. Louis or alone to Kansas City, has been held
valid. This is true, but in the decisions in none of those cases was
there any expression or ruling which impinges in the slightest degree on
the Constitutional prohibition against a local or special law being enacted
where a general law could have been made applicable; on the contrary,
either distinct or else implied recognition is constantly given to the idea,
that, owing to the circumstances and exigencies of the particular case,
a general law could not have been made apolicable, or where it could
not have been -made applicable by reason of the fact that the legislation
questioned was the result of direct obedience to some specific command
of the Constitution. This statement will be found to embrace all the
cases decided on the subject."
21. Kansas City ex rel District v. Scarritt (1895) 127 Mo. 642, 29
S. W. 845; Kansas City v. Stegmiller (1899) 151 Mo. 189, 52 S. W. 723.
22. (1908) 216 Mo. 108, 117, 115 S. W. 446.
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"In fine the constitutional idea was that charters under con-
sideration should present a complete scheme of local self-govern-
ment and that where their provisions conflict with the general
statutes on a merely municipal regulation (such as condemnation
proceedings are held to be) the charter provisions should con-
trol; and it has been held that the constitutional plan for amend-
ing charters (sec. 16, art. 9.), which directs that they shall be
amended by a vote of the people 'and not otherwise' is manda-
tory and forbids the regulation and direction of purely munici-
pal affairs by act of the legislature. (Kansas City v. Scarritt,23
127 Mo. supra.)"
The question frequently arises with respect to legislation
concerning the cities having "home rule" charters as to what
are matters of local concern as distinguished from matters of
public concern to the state. A number of decisions of the Su-
preme Court have been handed down upon this question, 24 but
the scope of this study does not include a discussion of them.
An interesting study of the Missouri cases is made by Professor
H. L. McBain of Columbia University in the Law and the Prac-
tice of Municipal Home Rule.
(4) Classification of Cities for Special Purposes.
Wherever the constitution authorizes legislation upon a giv-
en subject with reference to certain cities or class of cities then
laws passed in pursuance of such provision are upheld altho
they may not conform to one of the four classifications. An
example of this is the section which provides that: "The General
Assembly shall provide, by law, for the registration of all voters
in cities and counties having a population of more than one hun-
dred thousand inhabitants, and may provide for such registra-
tion in cities having a population exceeding twenty-five thousand
23. (1894.) 127 Mo. 642, 29 S. W. 845.
24. Kansas City ex rel District v. Scarritt (1894) 127 Mo. 642, 29
S. W. 845; Kansas City v. Ward (1896) 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600;
Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co. (1897) 140 Mo. 458, 41 S. W. 943. Mc-
Bain, Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule, pp. 172-179.
LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION
inhabitants and not exceeding one hundred thousand, but not
otherwise." 
25
This provision apparently recognizes two distinct classes of
cities, those having more and those having less than one hun-
dred thousand and more than twenty-five thousand inhabitants,
for the purpose of legislation providing for the registration of
voters. So in Ewing v. Hoblitzelle26 an act was quite prop-
erly upheld which regulated the registration of voters in cities
having over one hundred thousand inhabitants. The court goes
further in State ex. rel. McCaffrey v. Mason27 in holding a simi-
lar act valid which applied only to cities having more than three
hundred thousand inhabitants. Three of the judges based their
opinion on the ground that it was a proper classification, while
the other three were of the opinion that St. Louis, the only city
in the class, was set apart by the constitution into a class by it-
self and that legislation referring to St. Louis by name would
have been proper. It will be noted that the registration of vot-
ers is a matter of public concern and is not a matter of local
government except in so far as it has to do with city elections.
It is submitted that classification other than as to the two classes
impliedly provided in the constitution in respect to registration
laws should be tested by the same requirements as any other
law; and that any classification which is not based upon a dif-
ference which bears a reasonable relation to the end sought
should be held invalid as local and special.
Another provision in the constitution which classifies cities
is contained in section eleven of article ten. It limits the tax
rates for city purposes at different amounts for cities of different
populations. In Calland v. Springfield28 it was contended that
cities of the same class must have the same tax rate but the
court held that the classification for purposes of taxation did
25. Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Const. of Mo. of 1875.
26. (1884) 85 Mo. 64.
27. (1900) 155 Mo. 486, 55 S. W. 636. Affirmed in State v. Keat-
ing (1907) 202 Mo. 197, 100 S. W. 648.
28. (1914) 264 Mo. 296, 174 S. W. 396. See p. 20 for a further
discussion of this case.
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not involve the classification for the purpose of defining powers
and organization and that cities of the same class might have
different tax rates.
B. STATUTORY CLASSIFICATION WITHOUT DIRECTION BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
Under the Constitution of 1875, as interpreted by the
court decisions discussed above, there are seven classes of cities
in Missouri 'concerning which general laws may be passed
providing for their powers and organization; the four classes of
cities operating under general laws, the cities operating under
special charters, the general class of cities having "home rule"
charters, and St. Louis. Laws which conform to this classifica-
tion with respect to powers and organization present no diffi-
culty. It is with laws which do not conform to this classifica-
tion, or which do not concern powers and organization, or which
do neither that present the most difficulty.
(1) Laws Which Do Not Concern the Organization and Powers
of Cities.
Laws which do not concern the organization and powers of
cities are not general solely because they apply to all the cities of
a specified class.2 9  There must be peculiar conditions existing
in the class designated, with reference to which the law is en-
acted that justifies such classification." Thus a law which
29. Heifer v. Simon (1891) 53 N. J. L. 550; Dillon, Mun. Corp.
Sec. 151. Semble, State ex rel Harris v. Hermann (1882) 75 Mo. 340(law regulating notaries in cities having more than one hundred thou-
sand population held invalid).
In Helfer v. Simon, Scudder, J., in holding invalid a statute which
fixed term and compensation of city physician in cities of the second
class, said (loc. cit. 552): "In this case there has been no reason as-
signed, nor is it apparent, why an officer known as city physician, in a
city of the second class, should have a different appointment ........................
from a physician to be appointed and compensated in a city of the first
class or of the third class. Population cannot have any just reference
to this distinction between these classes by which the middle class is
separated from the others."
30. State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Miller (1890) 100 Mo. 439, 13 S. W.
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applies to the City of St. Louis in its function as a county in the
scheme of local government"' is not general merely because a
law applying to St. Louis as a city under a "home rule" charter
is regarded as general. The validity of such a law is determined
by the general test, i. e., whether a general law could have been
made applicable. In Henderson v. Koenig3 2 a law regulating
fees of the probate court in cities over three hundred thousand
was declared unconstitutional on the ground that there was no
exigency "requiring such legislation and confining its operation,
as does the act in question, to the City of St. Louis alone." 33
(2) Laws Which Do Not Comply with the Constitutional Classi-
fication of Cities.
The constitution requires that the powers of each class of
cities shall be the same, so that a law defining the powers of
677 (law providing for school directors in cities over three hundred thou
sand population).
31. Const. of Mo. Art. IX, Sec. 23; State ex rel Martin &. Wofford
(1893) 121 Mo. 61, 25 S. W. 851 (city was held to mean county).
32. (1902) 168 Mo. 356, 68 S. W. 72, 57 L. R. A. 659.
33. In the following cases laws were held unconstitutional be-
cause they were special: State v. Kring (1881) 74 Mo. 612 (an act regu.
lating procedure in the criminal courts of St. Louis) ; State v. Ausling-
er (1903) 171 Mo. 600, 71 S. W. 1041 (an act prohibiting fraudulent vot-
ing in cities over three hundred thousand in population) ; Wooley 7).
Mears (1910) 226 Mo. 41, 125 S. W. 1112 (an act prohibiting the offer
for sale of realty without written authority in cities of over three hundred
thousand inhabitants) ; State ex rel Garesche v. Roach (1914) 258 Mo.
541, 167 S. W. 1008 (the non-partisan judiciary act applicable to cities
over three hundred thousand in population).
In the following cases the laws were held general and constitutional:
State ex rel Monahan v. Walton (1879) 69 Mo. 556 (an act providing for
division of St. Louis into fourteen districts for election of justices of
the peace) ; State ex rel Manning v. Higgins (1894) 125 Mo. 364, 28 S.
W. 638 (an act authorizing judges of probate, criminal and circuit courts
in cities containing more than three hundred thousand inhabitants to
divide the city into districts for the purpose of electing constables and
justices of the peace) ; Spaulding v. Brady (1895) 128 Mo. 653, 31 S. W.
103 (an act regulating the salary of justices of the peace in cities over
three hundred thousand inhabitants) ; State cx rel Lionberger v. Tolle
(1880) 71 Mo. 645 (an act regulating the duties of judges of the circuit
court in cities having over one hundred thousand inhabitants) ; State v.
Hayes (1885) 88 Mo. 344 (a law giving the state in criminal cases ad-
ditional peremptory challenges in cities having more than one hundred
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cities must conform to the constitutional classification, and such
laws that do not so conform are unconstitutional. 3
But those laws which do not define the structure and pow-
ers of cities and towns may adopt any classification that has a
proper relation to the object sought. A local option dramshop
law was upheld in State ex rel Maggard v. Pond35 which ap-
plied to all cities having over two thousand five hundred inhabi-
tants altho it divided cities and towns of the fourth class into
two parts. Likewise in Ex Parte Lucas3 an act regulating the
occupation of barbers in cities having more than fifty thousand
inhabitants was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power
altho the act applied only to a few of the cities of the second
class. It was said there was a greater possibility of the spread
of disease thru barber shops of large cities than in smaller
places.
thousand inhabitants) ; State ex rel Martin v. Wofford (1893) 121 Mo.
61, 25 S. W. 851 (an act regulating appointment of stenographers in
criminal courts in cities having more than one hundred thousand inhab-
itants) ; State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Speed (1904) 183 Mo. 186, 81 S. W.
1260 (an act regulating salary of coal oil inspectors for cities of the
state with a population of three hundred thousand inhabitants); State
v. Tower (1904) 185 Mo. 79, 84 S. W. 10 (an act making a nuisance the
discharge of dense smoke in cities of over one hundred thousand inhabi-
tants) ; State ex rel Harvey v. Sheehan (1916) 269 Mo. 421, 190 S. W.
864 (an act regulating fees and duties of circuit attorneys in cities con-
taining over five hundred thousand inhabitants). Compare State ex rel
Harvey v. Sheehan with Henderson v. Koenig (1902) 168 Mo. 167, 65
S. W. 620, 57 L. R. A. 846, in which an act regulating the fees of the
probate court in cities having over three hundred thousand inhabitants
was held invalid.
34. State ex inf. Mytton v. Borden (1901) 164 Mo. 221, 65 S. W.
,172 (an act held invalid which created a board of public works in cities
of over one hundred thousand and less than one hundred fifty thousand
inhabitants, St. Joseph being the only city included) ; State ex rel Wyatt
v. Ashbrook (1900) 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627 (an act providing for
the licensing of department stores by city officials in cities containing
over fifty thousand inhabitants).
35. (1887) 93 Mo. 606, 6 S. W. 469. Affirmed: Ex Parte Handler
(1903) 176 Mo. 383, 75 S. W. 920; State v. Handler (1903) 178 Mo. 38,
76 S. W. 984.
36. (1901) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 218.
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Chapter VII. Local Option Laws.
A law passed in the regular manner by the legislature, and
made applicable to all units of any given class of units of local
government, but which must be adopted by the voters or of-
ficials in a prescribed manner in any of the local units in order
that that unit may avail itself of its provisions, is a local option
law. The law exists from its passage by the legislature but it
does not operate until the contingency happens provided for in
the act which usually is adoption by the voters. These laws
are confined to matters of local concern. The most common ex-
ample of these laws is the local option liquor laws, but the use
of this legislative device has been resorted to for the solution of
many other local problems.
The constitutionality of local option laws is attacked on
two grounds; first, it is a delegation of legislative power; second,
it is special legislation. The two contentions are so interde-
pendent that in order to discuss the second, it is necessary to dis-
pose of the first.
The first constitutional objection to local option laws was
raised in State ex rel Dome v. Wilcox1 against the validity of a
local option school law. Chapter forty seven of the General
Statutes of 1865 provided a method by which towns and villages
could be organized into school districts with given powers upon
compliance with certain conditions, the most important of which
was the adoption of the proposition by a prescribed vote in the
locality concerned. It was contended that this act was not a
law of its own force, enacted by the law-making power of the
land, but depended for its existence upon a vote of the people
of the locality where it was sought to be made operative; that
it was a delegation of legislative power and therefore void.2
Wagner, J., gave the opinion of the court that the law in
question was enacted by the legislature, that it applied to the
entire state, being the law everywhere whether voted upon or
1. (1870) 45 Mo. 458.
2. (1870) 45 Mo. 458, 461.
LAW SERIES 20, MISSOURI BULLETIN
not, and that it was constitutional, there being no delegation of
the legislative power whatsoever. "In the case we are now con-
sidering," said Wagner, J., "the act took effect with the other
laws contained in the statutes. It was passed according to the
prescribed forms designated in the constitution. Its enactment
did not depend upon any popular vote, but parties to be affected
by it were at liberty to accept the privileges granted, and incur
the burdens and obligations it would impose, as their interest or
will should dictate. If they elected not to avail themselves of
its privileges it did not in the least impair its force; it still stood
a valid enactment on the statute book." a
The legislature itself must enact the law.4 It cannot with-
out constitutional authority propose a law to be adopted by the
electorate,5 or by local officials. 6  Neither can the legislature
authorize the officials or voters df a locality to suspend a law.7
But, as it is said, "the legislature may gass a law to take effect or
go into operation on the happening of a future event or con-
tingency, and that such contingency may be a vote of the
people.""
The theory adopted in State ex rel Dome v. Wilcox, supra,
that the law exists regardless of its adoption by the voters in
any given locality and that it does not constitute a delegation of
legislative power, was followed in the subsequent cases on that
3. (1870) 45 Mo. 458, 464.
4. An amendment to the Constitution of Missouri adopted in the
general election held November 3, 1908, provides for the initative and
referendum on legislative acts as well as constitutional amendments.
This changes the law on this subject. See Section 57, Article IV, Con-
-stitution of Missouri.
5. State ex rel Dome v. Wilcox (1870) 45 Mo. 458, 464; Lammert
v. Lidwell (1876) 62 Mo. 188; Barto v. Himrod (1853) 4 Seld. (N. Y.)
483.
6. Ex Parte Smith (1910) 231 Mo. 111, 118, 132 S. W. 607.
7. State v. Field (1853) 17 Mo. 529.
8. State ex rel Maggard v. Pond (1887) 93 Mo. 606, 621, 6 S. W.
469; St. Louis v. Alexander (1856) 23 Mo. 483, 513.
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point and it remains the law today in this state.9 This doctrine
has also been adopted in nearly all other jurisdictions.10
The second objection urged against local option laws was
that such laws were special and local in that they operated only
in those localities adopting the act. This contention was made
in State ex rel Dome v. Wilcox, discussed in connection with
the first objection. Wagner, J., after holding that the local
option school law was enacted by the legislature and not by. the
voters and that the law existed in all parts of the state whether
adopted by vote or not in any given locality, disposed of this
second contention as follows: "Special statutes relate to certain
individual classes or particular localities. Had the act applied
to a certain specified town or a single corporation, it would have
been special; but such is not the case. It is co-extensive with
the state, and its influence is felt in every county and almost
every township. It is conceded that it does not include in its
operation every individual nor extend to all territory, but that
is not required.""
The theory of this decision is that the law derives its exis-
tence from the enactment by the legislature and not from adop-
tion in any given locality, hence its existence is general thruout
the state and is not confined to localities adopting the same. The
school law does not of itself organize a school district and give
it powers, but it provides a method by which the people of the
locality may organize and upon this district, duly organized in
9. Opinion of Supreme Court Judges on Township Organization
Law (1874) 55 Mo. 295; State ex rel Maggard v. Pond (1887) 93 Mo.
606, 5 S. W. 469 (local option dramshop law); Ex Parte Handler (1903)
176 Mo. 383, 75 S. W. 920 (dramshop law); State v. Handler (1903)
178 Mo. 38, 76 S. W. 984 (dramshop law) ; Hall v. Sedalia (1910) 232
Mo. 344, 134 S. W. 650 (local option sewer and drainage law for cities
of third class) ; State ex inf. Wright v. Morgan (1916) 268 Mo. 265, 187
S. W. 54 (local option school district consolidation act).
10. Opinion of the Justices (1894) 160 Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488;
In re O'Brien (1904) 29 Mont. 530, 75 Pac. 196, 1 Ann. Cases 373 and
note p. 378. Also see note, J. P. Hall, Cases on Constitutional Law, p.
121. Contra: Rice v. Foster (1847) 4 Harr. (Del.) 479.
11. (1870) 45 Mo. 458, 465.
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accordance with the provision of the statute, the law operates by
investing it with certain powers.
This theory was affirmed a few years later in the Opinion
of Supreme Court Judges on Township Organization Law.'? In
reference to the Township Organization Law the court said: "It
is b. general law made for the whole State, and by the terms of
the act itself took effect from and after its passage. Every
county in the State may avail itself of the privileges offered by
this law by a majority vote of its people. It is left to the option
of the counties whether they will organize under it or not. If
a majority -vote for it, such vote does not create the law, but
places the county so voting within its provisions and the organi-
zation then takes effect, and also the law, as it existed before the
vote was taken."
The question was again brought up in State ex rel Mag-
gard v. Pond13 in which a local option dramshop law was held
constitutional and the doctrine of the earlier cases affirmed.
There was a strong dissenting opinion by Sherwood, J., in which
he contended that the constitutionality of the act was to be de-
termined by its operation and not by its form.14
The act was local in operation, hence void as a local law.
It was also objectionable as a special law since it singled out
those members of the class of dramshop keepers in the state
which resided in places adopting the vote and prohibited them
from selling liquor. It was also ineffective because it resulted
in the enactment of a special and local law by the partial re-
peal in those counties and cities adopting the act of a general
12. (1874) 55 Mo. 297.
13. (1887) 93 Mo. 606, 6 S. W. 469.
14. (1887) 93 Mo. 606, 641. Sherwood, J., dissenting: "If the
legislature by an act had designated those counties and towns by name
which have as it is said, adopted by their votes 'local option,' it could not
be doubted that such an act would be both special and local. The fact that
the people, by their votes, instead of the legislature, by an act, have desig-
nated those counties, can not alter the principle or vary the result; for
what the legislature cannot do directly it cannot do indirectly. In such
cases, the 'constitutionality of an act is to be determined by its operation,
and not by the form it may be made to assume,' State ex rel. v. The Judges,
21 Oh. St. 11."
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law providing for the sale of liquor. Also it was void, he argued,
as a suspension of the general law authorizing the sale of liquor.
The answer of the court to these propositions was that the law
was of general application, that this was sufficient, and that "the
fact that one or more counties, or one or more cities or town6,
may, by a majority vote, put the law in operation in said county
or counties, cities or towns, and that other counties or cities and
towns may not do so, does not affect the rule nor furnish a test
by which to decide whether the law is local or general, and this
court has never held otherwise." 15
Sherwood, J., further contended: "If such legislation as this
is valid then I confess I can see no obstacle in the way of having
murder, rape, burglary, etc., punished in as many various ways
as the voters in an equal number of localities may, by virtue of
their newly-found law making function, determine." 18 And
again "Under its operation, the laws respecting commercial pap-
er, limitations of actions, the punishment of crimes, etc., may
vary with different localities, and still be held general laws, and
constitutional.' 7  The answer to this argument is that local op-
tion laws are only valid as to local matters."' As to what is a
15. (1887) 93 Mo. 606, 621, 6 S. W. 469.
16. (1887) 93 Mo. 606, 647, 6 S. W. 469.
17. (1887) 93 Mo. 606, 687, 6 S. W. 469.
18. "It may be conceded as the established doctrine, that statutes
creating municipal corporations or imposing liabilities upon municipal-
ities, or authorizing municipalities to incur debts and obligations, or to
make improvements, may be referred to the popular vote of the
districts immediately affected- that is to say, the people of
such districts may decide whether they will accept the incor-
poration or will assume the burdens. This is the prevailing rule in ref-
erence to local matters." Wagner, J., in Lammert v. Lidwell (1876) 62
Mo. 188, 191. "Thus it will be observed that both the majority and
minority opinions proceed from the same premises, to-wit, that it is a
delegation of legislative power for the legislature to submit to the people
at large for their adoption or rejection a law which affects the whole
people, but that it is not a delegation of legislative power for the Legis-
lature to enact a complete law, conferring a power or privilege upon a
locality as to a mere matter of local concern, and leave it to the will of the
constituted authorities of the locality or to the people thereof, to exercise
the power or privilege as they see fit."--Marshall, J., in dissenting opin-
ion, commenting upon State ex rel Maggard v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 6 S. W.
469, in Owen v. Baer (1899) 154 Mo. 434, 528, 55 S. W. 644.
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local matter depends upon custom and the nature and peculiar
interests of local government.' 9 Sherwood, J., insisted that local
option liquor laws including the enforcement acts were a part of
the general criminal law of the state and were not a matter for
local discretion. But the court held in accordance with the
weight of authority elsewhere2" that such laws were proper as
a matter of local police regulation, and this view has remained
the law in this state. 2 1
In conclusion it may be said that a local option law is created
by act of the legislature; that it exists thruout the state regard-
less o f adoption by the voters in any given unit of local govern-
ment to which the act applies; that it must concern a subject
which may properly be dealt with differently by different parts
of the state, such as matters of local government and matters
of local improvement, local welfare and local police regulations;
and that it does not become a special or local law within the con-
stitutional prohibition when set in operation by adoption in any
locality. When adopted such laws carry with them criminal
enforcement laws, and these enforcement laws are not objec-
tionable as a denial of equal protection of the law because they
make an act a crime in one locality which would not be so in an-
other locality where the law has not been adopted. The crimin-
al feature is, incidental and necessary for enforcement of local
option laws wherever they are set in operation. 21
Columbia, Missouri. RoSCOE E. HARPER
19. Opinion' of the Justices (1894) 160 Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488;
State v. Copeland (1896) 66 Minn. 315, 69 N. W. 27, 61 Am. St. Rep. 410.
20. Fouts v. Hood River, (1905) 46 Or. 492, 81 Pac. 370, 1 L .R. A.
N. S. 483; In re O'Brien (1904) 29 Mont. 530, 75 Pac. 196, 1 Am. &
Eng. Ann. Cas. 373, and note on p. 378 in which the authorities are
listed. Also see J. P. Hall, Cases on Constitutional Law, pp. 116, 121.
21. Owen v. Baer (1899) 154 Mo. 434, 55 S. W. 644; Ex Parte
Handier (1903) 176 Mo. 383, 75 S. W. 920; State v. Handier (1903) 178
Mo. 38, 76 S. W. 984; Hall v. Sedalia (1910) 232 Mo. 344, 134 S. W.
650; Barnes v. Kirksville (1915) 266 Mo. 270, 280, 180 S. W. 545.
22. Ex Parte Swann (1888) 96 Mo. 44, 51, 9 S. W. 10; State v.
Rawlings (1910) 232 Mo. 544, 134 S. W. 530.
